This paper discusses the sensitivity of the shape of history to routine actions. It argues that given the possibility of non-deterministic effects, most actions do not have the power to radically alter the shape of the future.

This paper argues that interactionists face difficulties making sense of how minds could influence the right neurons in a brain to produce the range of behaviors of which we are capable.

This paper suggests that moral attitudes are distinguished from other attitudes by their functional properties in a restricted range of contexts and by the the resemblance of their ingredients in other contexts. This proposal provides a novel solution to the Frege-Geach problem.

This paper reflects on the significance of Savulescu's principle of procreative beneficence for the long-term future of the human species.

In this paper, I propose that those who reject higher-order theories of consciousness should not rule out the possibility of having conscious experiences that they cannot introspect.

This paper discusses how noncognitivists might extend their accounts of moral judgments to other kinds of moral attitudes, such as moral hopes and moral intuitions.

This paper suggests that metaethical expressivists should be unbothered by a large number of brute norms and hence that they should be free to postulate their way out of Unwin's negation problem.